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Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions 
J. Atsu Amegashie* 
 
“Sincerity makes the very least person to be of more value 
than the most talented hypocrite.” – Charles Spurgeon1 
“To give real service you must add something which cannot be 
bought or measured with money, and that is sincerity and 
integrity.” – Douglas Adams2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In standard economics and game theory, only actions affect 
payoffs. Intentions are irrelevant. It is the final outcome that 
matters not the process. But there are clearly situations where 
intentions affect payoffs. The same action might induce different 
payoffs depending on the intentions of the parties or players. 
Indeed, intentions matter in important ways. Intention is the 
basis for the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter 
and partly explains the attitudes of certain groups towards racial 
profiling. For murder or manslaughter, the same action (i.e., 
taking a person’s life) may attract a different punishment 
depending on whether the action is believed to be premeditated 
or not. For racial profiling, a traveler at an airport or a motorist 
who is searched by the police may react differently depending on 
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whether he believes that the search was random or was 
motivated by his race or religion. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the following class of 
social interactions or prosocial behavior. Suppose someone offers 
to help you but you thought the offer might be motivated by guilt 
rather than a genuine desire to help; will you accept the offer? 
Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely 
accepted by your peers and “friends.” In particular, suppose you 
are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc., not because your 
company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if 
she did not invite you; or you got a job at an elite institution but 
you would not have been offered the job if you were not a 
minority; or someone gives you a present because they felt 
obligated to do so, not because they really wanted to give you a 
present. If your boss, supervisor, or professor tells you to feel free 
to come talk to her anytime you encounter problems in your 
work, would you take her up on that offer if you thought she was 
making the offer grudgingly? Does one’s enjoyment from sex 
depend on whether her partner’s intention is a long-term 
relationship or casual relationship? Will the answer affect the 
decision to accept or reject an offer into a sexual relationship? In 
all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention behind the 
action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. The 
intention will matter if the target of the offer is averse to 
insincerity. 
The average reader may be able to relate to some of these 
situations from personal experience. These examples are common 
and interesting social interactions worthy of study. They are the 
basis of friendships and relationships at work, school, church, 
and in our daily lives. They determine whom we choose to go to 
lunch with, play with, and in general socialize with. They 
determine the frequency and enjoyment of our social interactions. 
One may assume that there is already some kind of 
superficial, implicit, or lower-level relationship between the two 
parties. For example, they may work at the same place or they 
may be neighbors. The question is: will the parties necessarily 
engage in mutually beneficial trades in a world where the 
sincerity of actions matter? 
In what follows, I refer to the player who offers to help or 
extends an invitation to a social event (e.g., dinner) as the 
proposer, and the other player as the responder. 
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Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer show that intentions 
can also be modeled as stemming from interdependent type 
preferences: preferences over someone’s physical or social 
characteristics (e.g., race, height, gender, personality).3 In the 
social interaction in the present paper, the responder has 
interdependent type preferences because he cares about the 
proposer’s social type (i.e., whether the proposer is prosocial or 
not). Knowledge of the proposer’s social type will help the 
responder determine the sincerity of the proposer’s offer and 
hence determine the intention behind his offer. This requires that 
the responder forms beliefs about the proposer’s social type or 
characteristic. 
Psychological game theory pioneered by John Geanakoplos, 
David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti4 models intentions as beliefs 
about beliefs, where players have belief dependent preferences. 
There have been important extensions and analysis of this 
approach.5 
This paper has elements of psychological games and 
interdependent type preferences. Both approaches to modeling 
intentions in games are complementary. Indeed, John Searle 
argues, in a very influential philosophical work, that sincerity is 
linked to a person’s state of mind (i.e., his beliefs).6 Insofar as 
this paper is concerned with the sincerity of a person’s behavior 
or altruism, psychological game theory, a model with 
interdependent type preferences, or some combination gives an 
appropriate analytical framework. 
I find that the beliefs of both parties play a key role in 
generating an equilibrium with sincere or insincere offers. In 
particular, the beliefs held by the players can lead to an 
equilibrium in which the responder does not reject mutually 
                                                           
 3. See Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Canonical Type Space for 
Interdependent Preferences, 2 (July 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~pesendor/ interdependent.pdf. 
 4. John Geanakoplos et al., Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, 
1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 60, 61 (1989). 
 5. See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and 
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1284 (1993); Armin Falk et al., On the 
Nature of Fair Behavior, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 20, 20 (2003); Gary Charness & Martin 
Dufwenberg, Promises and Partnerships, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1579, 1580 (2006); 
Armin Falk et al., Testing Theories of Fairness—Intentions Matter 7 (Institute for 
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working Paper No. 63, 
2000), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/ iewwp063.pdf. 
 6. JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY INTO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
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beneficial trades (i.e., sincere offers), although she is uncertain 
about the proposer’s social type. Equilibriums with insincere 
offers are also possible. I also discuss the implications of 
insincerity aversion for altruism, political correctness, and trust. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, I briefly discuss the role of guilt and insincerity in social 
interactions. Section 3 presents a simple model of social 
interaction under incomplete information in a dynamic 
psychological game and characterizes its equilibriums. I discuss 
applications in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. GUILT AVERSION AND INSINCERITY AVERSION 
In the social interaction studied, guilt plays an important 
role. As Roy Baumeister, Arlene Stillwell, and Todd Hearther note 
“. . . guilt is something that happens between people rather than 
just inside them. That is, guilt is an interpersonal phenomenon 
that is functionally and causally linked to communal 
relationships between people. The origins, functions, and 
processes of guilt all have important interpersonal aspects.”7 
They continue “[t]his is not to deny that some experiences of guilt 
can take place in the privacy of one’s individual psyche, in social 
isolation. Still, many of those instances may be derivative of 
interpersonal processes and may reflect highly socialized 
individuals.”8 
Building on a well-known idea in psychology, Gary Charness 
and Martin Dufwenberg introduce the term guilt aversion to 
describe the behavior of people who suffer guilt if they believe 
that they have hurt another person because they did not meet 
that person’s expectation.9 It refers to the disutility felt from 
disappointing others or letting them down. They show how guilt 
aversion can sustain good or co-operative behavior.10 
In a related contribution, Peter Huang examines how guilt 
can motivate securities professionals’ behavior in their fiduciary 
relationships with their clients and the legal implications of guilt 
                                                           
 7. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Guilt: An Interpersonal Approach, 115 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 243, 243 (1994). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5, at 1580. 
 10. Id. 
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for the regulation of securities professionals.11 In a different but 
related context, Peter Huang and Ho-Mou Wu examine how 
remorse can lead to better social order.12 In both papers, the 
basic notion is that guilt provides an internal mechanism beyond 
the external mechanisms for legal compliance provided by private 
litigation, public enforcement, and formal sanctions.13 
A very important difference in the present paper is that I 
argue that insincere offers, motivated by guilt aversion, impose a 
cost (disutility) on the responder. This insincerity-induced 
disutility or insincerity aversion produces an effect that is absent 
in previous works on guilt aversion.14 In particular, while guilt 
aversion in these papers can sustain cooperation or good 
behavior, the likelihood of such cooperation may fall because 
guilt-induced cooperation may be perceived by one party as 
insincere and hence may be rejected because this party dislikes 
insincere or forced cooperation. 
A person may be a sincerity pragmatist if, in certain contexts, 
she may care about sincerity, while in other contexts, she may 
not. She may have an intrinsic value for sincerity in certain 
situations, as the quote by Douglas Adams at the beginning of 
this paper suggests, but may have an instrumental value for 
sincerity in other situations. This kind of cost-benefit calculus by 
such sincerity pragmatists is alluded to by the Nobel laureate, 
Albert Camus when he opined: “[H]ow can sincerity be a 
condition of friendship? A taste for truth at any cost is a passion 
which spares nothing.”15 In the same vein, John Kang makes a 
case for insincerity in a democracy. He argues that insincerity in 
public discourse is necessary for tolerance and mutual co-
existence in liberal democracies.16 I return to this issue when I 
discuss political correctness and other applications in section 4. 
                                                           
 11. See Peter Huang, Trust, Guilt and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1059, 1059 (2003). 
 12. Peter Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of 
Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 394–97 
(1994). 
 13. See id.; Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5, at 1585. 
 14. See Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5; Huang, supra note 11; Huang 
& Wu, supra note 12. 
 15. Quote available at Brainy Quote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/ 
authors/a/albert_camus.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 16. See John M. Kang, The Uses of Insincerity: Thomas Hobbes’s Theory of 
Law and Society, 15 LAW & LITERATURE 371 (2003) [hereinafter Kang, Uses]; John 
M. Kang, The Case for Insincerity, 29 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 143 (2003) 
[hereinafter Kang, Cases]. 
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The preceding point calls for reasons why a person may be 
averse to insincerity or have a preference for sincerity, and why 
such a preference may be driven by instrumental or intrinsic 
motivations. Notice that in the above papers17 only one player is 
guilt-averse or only one player’s guilt aversion is relevant to the 
analysis. My model could be seen as one in which both players 
are guilt-averse but for different reasons. Under this 
interpretation, the proposer extends insincere offers to assuage 
his guilt while the responder dislikes the offers because she feels 
guilty if she believes that she is forcing someone to accept her or 
be nice to her out of guilt. While the proposer feels guilty for 
disappointing others, the responder feels guilty if she believes 
that she is manipulating the proposer’s guilt for her personal 
gain. The responder does not feel guilty if she rejects an offer. 
People may be insincerity averse if they believe that the 
intention behind an offer or an apparent prosocial behavior is to 
make them feel morally obliged to reciprocate in the future or 
requires them to stroke their benefactor’s ego by being held to an 
emotional ransom of a perpetual demonstration of gratitude. 
Insincerity-aversion may also stem from the belief that those 
who act out of guilt are ultimately not trust-worthy. They can 
fake their behavior for only a short while but eventually their true 
feelings and behavior will come out. So the responder may be 
insincerity-averse because she wants to interact with people that 
she can trust. To avoid the cost of being unpleasantly surprised, 
insincerity-averse people will terminate cooperation sooner than 
later. 
Related to the previous point is the observation that the 
desire to know the sincerity of others in socio-economic 
relationships may stem from the fact that knowledge of such 
sincerity or the degree thereof may determine the effort that an 
insincerity-averse person puts into the relationship.18 The cost of 
insincerity is then the cost of over-investing in the relationship 
based on the erroneous information or presumption that the 
person being dealt with was sincere. In this regard, Claire Hill 
and Erin O’Hara examine how the law should intervene to either 
promote more accurate trust levels or to mitigate the costs of 
                                                           
 17. See Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5; Huang, supra note 11; Huang 
& Wu, supra note 12. 
 18. Interview with Claire A. Hill, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota 
Law School, in Minneapolis, Minn. (April 6, 2007). 
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mistaken assessments in contractual and non-contractual 
relationships.19 
Ian Ayres and Greg Klass present a lucid and interesting 
examination of the legal implications of insincere promises and 
misrepresented intent.20 A promise is insincere if the promisor 
never intended to fulfill the promise. According to them, a 
promisee cares about the sincerity of the promisor because 
breach-of-contract damages are not fully compensatory. If such 
damages were fully compensatory, a promisee will not care about 
the sincerity of the promisor.21 This is consistent with our earlier 
point that a person may be insincerity-averse because dealing 
with an insincere person is costly.22 However, Claire Hill and Erin 
O’Hara observe that full compensation for breach-of-contract 
damages may lead to excessive levels of trust in contracting 
relationships.23 
It is conceivable that in formal and financial matters of the 
kind analyzed by Peter Huang,24 a person may have an 
instrumental value for sincerity but in non-financial and informal 
matters, the same person may be more likely to have an intrinsic 
value for sincerity. Indeed, in formal relationships protected by 
the law, guilt-aversion is more likely to sustain cooperation 
because the law reduces the cost of insincerity, even if it does not 
eliminate it. Hence insincerity aversion will matter less in such 
relationships than in informal relationships. 
                                                           
 19. See Claire Hill & Erin A. O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust 2, 32 
(Minnesota Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 05-51, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=869423. 
 20. See Ian Ayres & Greg Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. 
L. REV. 507, 508. See generally IAN AYRES & GREG KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: 
THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005). 
 21. AYRES & KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES, supra note 20, at 61. 
 22. To be sure, any moral hazardous behavior in a principal-agent 
relationship could be considered insincere behavior. However, in a standard 
principal-agent model, the principal would not derive any disutility from an 
agent who exerts a high effort or desists from moral hazard behavior out of guilt. 
The principal only cares about actions not intentions. And if the principal cares 
about intentions, it is only in an instrumental sense insofar as intentions affect 
actions. In contrast, my model is also applicable to situations where intentions 
have intrinsic value for people and therefore the same action will yield different 
payoffs depending on the intention behind it. 
 23. Hill & O’Hara, supra note 19, at 31–32. 
 24. Huang, supra note 11, at 3–7, 33–35. 
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3. A GAME OF SOCIAL INTERACTION WITH GUILT 
In this section, I consider a very simple model to examine the 
several examples of prosocial behavior mentioned in section 1, 
where the sincerity of actions matters. While the model is 
applicable to those examples, I use one specific example in this 
section for the sake of exposition. In particular, I focus on 
situations where the proposer has the option of helping the 
responder in an activity. In section 4, I demonstrate how this 
simple model can be adapted to the issue of political correctness. 
Consider two people, player 1 and player 2.25 Player 1 has 
the option of proposing to help player 2 in some activity. Player 1 
could be either prosocial, in which case he enjoys helping player 
2, or he could be asocial, in which case he grudgingly helps 
player 2 out of guilt. Player 2 does not know for sure whether 
player 1 is prosocial or asocial. 
Furthermore, player 1 feels guilty if he does not offer to help 
player 2. Player 1’s guilt depends on the extent to which he 
believes that he has disappointed player 2.26 The higher player 1 
believes is the level of player 2’s disappointment, the more guilt 
player 1 has. 
An offer is insincere if player 1 is asocial and it is sincere if 
player 1 is prosocial. If player 2 believes that player 1 genuinely 
wants to help her, she gets a positive payoff if she accepts player 
1’s offer. If she believes that player 1’s offer is insincere, she 
incurs a psychic cost if she accepts player 1’s offer. Thus, player 
2 will not knowingly accept an insincere offer. However, since she 
does not know for sure whether player 1 is prosocial or asocial, 
there is some possibility that she might accept insincere offers or 
reject sincere ones. 
Player 1 has two actions: offer to help or do not offer to help. 
Player 2 has two actions: accept or reject an offer from player 1. 
The game is sequential. Player 1 is the first-mover and player 2 is 
the second-mover. 
Player 1 need not show that his offer is out of guilt if he is 
asocial. It is sufficient for player 2 to believe that player 1’s offer 
is insincere. It is player 2’s inference about player 1’s intentions 
                                                           
 25. I use male pronouns for player 1 and female pronouns for player 2. 
 26. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, Guilt in Games, 97 AM. ECON. 
REV. 170, 174–75 (2007). The formulation of guilt in this paper follows the 
analysis of Pierpaolo Battogalli and Martin Dufwenberg. 
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that matters. Therefore, the same action (i.e., offer) by player 1 
could give player 2 different payoffs depending on her beliefs 
about player 1’s intentions. 
It is important to note that player 1 does not feel guilty so 
long as he offers to help player 2, even if he does not want player 
2 to accept his offer. If he is asocial, he might offer to help player 
2 and if player 2 rejects, then he suffers no guilt. While the 
motivation for this behavior may be straightforward, it may be 
helpful to elaborate further. One explanation is that player 1 does 
not feel guilty because he can justify his behavior on the grounds 
that he, after all, took the risk of offering to help player 2. This is 
what Baumeister et al. refer to as the deconstruction of guilt. 27 
Of course, if player 2 could tell that player 1 extended an 
insincere offer with the goal of getting his offer rejected, then a 
rejection of an insincere offer from player 2 could make player 1 
feel guilty. 28 However, due to incomplete information, player 2 
cannot in general be certain of the insincerity of player 1’s offer. 
Therefore, due to incomplete information, the rejection of an 
insincere offer does not make player 1 feel guilty.29 
3.1 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
I looked for psychological perfect Bayesian equilibriums 
(PPBE) of this game, defined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
(PBE) with the additional requirement that players’ endogenous 
first-order and higher-order beliefs are correct in equilibrium.30 
                                                           
 27. See Baumeister et al., supra note 7, at 259 (noting that by focusing not 
on the implications of one’s actions, one can escape guilt); Seinfeld: The 
Apartment, infra note 37. 
 28. Of course, player 1’s guilt need not depend on player 2’s words or 
actions. This is at the heart of the distinction between simple guilt and guilt from 
blame considered in this paper. See discussion infra Parts 3.1.1, 3.1.2. 
 29. It may sometimes appear that what we refer to as guilt should actually be 
called shame. Accordingly, one may argue that what Pierpaolo Battigalli and 
Martin Dufwenberg refer to as guilt from blame should be called shame. See 
Battigalli & Dufwenberg, supra note 26, at 172. In order not to get bogged down 
by semantics, we do not make this distinction. 
 30. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy profile that is sequentially 
rational given a system of beliefs that is obtained using Bayes rule. Julio 
Gonzalez-Diaz & Miguel A. Melendez-Jimenez, A Formal Definition of Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games, 2 (June 7, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www. 
kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/gonzalezdiaz/papers/Perfect_Bayesian.pdf. 
Bayes’ rule provides a mathematical approach to how one should change his or 
her existing beliefs in light of new evidence. In Praise of Bayes, ECONOMIST, Sept. 
30, 2000, at 83. 
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All proofs can be found in the technical appendix to this paper.31 
3.1.1 Simple Guilt 
Player 2’s disappointment is a function of the difference 
between her expected payoff and her actual payoff. In this simple 
guilt formulation, player 1 feels guilty as a result of the 
disappointment felt by player 2, even if player 2 does not blame 
him for his actions.32 
The following proposition holds in this game: 
Proposition 1: If player 1 suffers from simple guilt and 
player 2 does not expect any insincere offers; player 1 believes 
that player 2 does not expect any insincere offers; and player 2 
has a sufficiently low valuation for sincere offers and/or a 
sufficiently high disutility for insincere offers and/or player 1 has 
a sufficiently low sensitivity to guilt, then there exists a 
psychological PBE in the social interaction game where all offers 
are sincere and player 2 accepts all offers. 
We can also state the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: If player 1 suffers from simple guilt, then 
there exists a PPBE in which player 1 always offers to help player 
2. Player 2 rejects player 1’s offer if her valuation of sincere offers 
is sufficiently small and accepts player 1’s offer if her valuation of 
sincere offers is sufficiently high. 
3.1.2 Guilt from Blame 
In addition to simple guilt, Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin 
Dufwenberg also consider another formulation of guilt, in which 
a player who has disappointed another player feels guilty 
depending on the extent to which the affected player blames him 
for his actions.33 They refer to this as guilt from blame.34 
One can interpret simple guilt as the guilt felt from blaming 
one’s own self and guilt from blame as the guilt felt from being 
blamed by others.35 Unlike guilt from blame, player 1 blames 
                                                           
 31. More elaborate arguments can be found in a version of this paper at 
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~jamegash/intentions_interaction_psychological.pdf. 
 32. See Battigalli & Dufwenberg, supra note 26, at 171 (noting that with 
simple guilt a player cares about how much he lets another player down). 
 33. See Battigalli & Dufwenberg, supra note 26, at 175. 
 34. Id. at 172. 
 35. Id. at 171–72. 
J. Atsu Amegashie, "Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions," 9(2) Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 
861-882 (2008). 
2008] INTENTIONS, GUILT & SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 871 
himself under simple guilt for not offering to help player 2, even if 
he is asocial. This makes sense because it is not uncommon for 
people to feel guilty, blame themselves for having certain 
antisocial preferences, or for being of an antisocial type, even if 
they do not change their preferences. 
It is implicitly assumed that for the same level of 
disappointment incurred by player 2, player 1’s guilt sensitivity is 
the same whether he blames himself or he is blamed by player 2. 
This may not be the case in practice, although it seems to be the 
correct methodological assumption to make. In that way, 
differences in equilibrium behavior from these different 
formulations of guilt will only be attributed to the differences in 
the strategic incentives that they induce as opposed to 
differences in a player’s distaste for feelings of guilt. 
Note that there can be no guilt from blame when player 1 
offers to help player 2 or when player 2 rejects player 1’s offer. 
Therefore, guilt from blame is only possible when player 1 does 
not offer to help player 2. 
In the case of guilt from blame, the proof of the equilibrium of 
this social interaction is very straightforward. To this see this, 
observe that player 1 feels no guilt if he does not offer to help 
player 2 because player 2 will not blame him for doing so. Player 
2 understands that if player 1 does not offer to help her, then it 
must be the case that he is asocial, or he would only insincerely 
offer to help her. Moreover, since player 2 dislikes insincere 
offers, she does not get disappointed and so does not blame 
player 1.36 Under guilt from blame, player 1 will not extend 
insincere offers; hence, all offers are sincere. The proposition 
below then follows: 
Proposition 3: If player 1 suffers from guilt from blame, then 
there is a unique PPBE in which all offers are sincere and no 
offers are rejected. 
4. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATIONS 
Let me begin this section by noting that the story could be 
told differently but with similar results. In particular, the timing 
of actions could be reversed where player 2 is the first mover and 
player 1 is the second mover. In this case, player 2 initiates a 
                                                           
 36. She does not infer that player 1 wants to disappoint her. Her inference is 
that player 1 is not extending her an offer because player 1 knows that she does 
not like insincere offers. 
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request by asking player 1 for help or makes no such request. 
Player 1’s response to a request for help is yes or no. Player 1 
does not feel guilty if player 2 does not ask for help and he does 
not offer to help. 
Casual empiricism confirms a result akin to proposition 2. 
That is, we sometimes do not ask people for favors because we 
feel that we may be bothering them and therefore they may help 
us grudgingly out of guilt. So player 2 sometimes does not ask for 
help, which is equivalent to the cases in which she rejects player 
1’s offer in proposition 2. 
Suppose player 1 feels guilty if he does not offer to help, 
although player 2 has made no request. Indeed, not asking for 
help is a signal from player 2 to player 1 that she believes, with a 
sufficiently high probability, that he is asocial. Then knowing 
that player 2 will reject his offer, player 1 will make an offer 
precisely for this reason and thereby assuage his guilt. In this 
case, player 1’s offer is akin to a costless action in a cheap-talk 
game. This also accords with casual empiricism where we 
sometimes make offers to people who we know will not accept our 
offer and we, indeed, do not want them to accept our offer.37 
In what follows and without loss of generality, I will continue 
with the original formulation of the game where player 1 is the 
first mover. 
Proposition 1 is interesting because it shows that even if 
player 2 is suspicious of player 1’s intentions, there are beliefs 
which can sustain a PBE where sincere offers are never rejected. 
However, proposition 3, relative to the propositions under 
simple guilt, is even more interesting. Unlike simple guilt, 
proposition 3 shows that under guilt from blame, there cannot be 
                                                           
 37. A clear example of this was the April 4, 1991 episode of Seinfeld titled 
“The Apartment.” Mrs. Hudwalker, a tenant in one of the apartments where Jerry 
is also a tenant, dies and Jerry proposes to Elaine to take the newly vacant and 
very cheap apartment just above his own. Later, he realized that it was a big 
mistake after talking to George. However, Jerry could not tell Elaine that he did 
not want her to live in the same building because he would feel guilty. Luckily, 
Kramer found someone who could offer the superintendent $10,000 per month 
for the apartment; a sum that Jerry knew Elaine could not afford. Jerry is able to 
assuage or deconstruct his guilt by telling himself that Elaine would never know 
that he did not want her to have the apartment after the original proposal. To the 
extent that TV shows are reflections of parts of our real lives, this Seinfeld 
episode clearly shows that people do not only extend insincere offers to assuage 
their guilt, but they also do so hoping that such offers will not be accepted. 
Seinfeld: The Apartment (NBC television broadcast Apr. 4, 1991). 
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equilibriums with insincere offers. This accords with intuition 
because if player 2 is averse to insincerity and if player 1 is 
sensitive to blame from player 2, then player 2 will place the 
minimal blame possible on player 1 mindful of the fact that it is 
player 1’s guilt aversion which causes him to extend insincere 
offers. With such minimal blame, player 1 has no incentive to 
extend insincere offers in order to assuage his guilt. On the other 
hand, if player 2’s blame has no effect on player 1’s guilt (i.e., 
simple guilt), then player 2 cannot guarantee sincerity. 
Note that player 1 offers to help player 2 if he believes that 
player 2 expects an offer and will be sufficiently disappointed 
otherwise. This accords very well with casual empiricism. The 
emotional cost (i.e., guilt) of disappointing player 2 coupled with 
player 2’s expectations could force player 1 to be kind to her, 
although he would have preferred to act otherwise. 
The preceding observation applies generally to the way we 
tolerate others who we would otherwise not have tolerated. In 
some cases, we do so only because such people expect to be 
treated with respect. 
Unlike the equilibriums in propositions 1 and 3, the 
equilibrium in proposition 2 involves some insincere offers due to 
player 1’s guilt aversion. One may then conclude that guilt 
breeds insincerity. While this is sometimes true, proposition 1, 
for example, suggests that this is not always the case. In addition 
to guilt aversion, the players’ expectations or beliefs play a 
crucial role in generating an equilibrium with insincere or sincere 
offers. If player 2 expects an insincere offer and player 1 believes 
that player 2 expects an insincere offer, then these beliefs 
coupled with a high guilt sensitivity may indeed lead to an 
equilibrium with insincere offers. On the other hand, if player 2 
expects sincere offers and player 1 believes that player 2 expects 
sincere offers, then these beliefs coupled with low guilt sensitivity 
yield an equilibrium with only sincere offers. 
However, even if guilt aversion breeds insincerity, is that 
necessarily a bad thing? Not really. As Gary Charness and Martin 
Dufwenberg demonstrate, guilt aversion and verbal promises can 
create commitment power that may foster trust and 
cooperation.38 Peter Huang makes a similar point;39 however, in 
                                                           
 38. Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5, at 1594–95. 
 39. Huang, supra note 11, at 1084 (noting that due to loyalty to her client, a 
broker would have such guilt aversion that the broker would not misbehave). 
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our model guilt aversion need not sustain cooperation or good 
behavior because player 2 may perceive player 1 as cooperating 
reluctantly or cooperating out of guilt. Therefore, the issue may 
not be whether guilt aversion leads to insincerity but whether the 
insincerity per se has an adverse effect on the utility of other 
relevant players. As argued in section 2, insincerity-induced 
disutility is less likely in financial matters of the kind analyzed by 
Peter Huang.40 
One can adapt the guilt aversion model to political 
correctness41 as follows: When player 1 is prosocial, he gets a 
benefit from using politically-correct language (e.g., affirmative 
action is a good policy). When he is asocial, he prefers to use 
politically incorrect language, which imposes a cost on him. This 
cost may stem from the mental and emotional effort required to 
restrain his language or suppress his true opinion. However, 
there is a cost of using politically incorrect language, which 
depends on the social norms of using appropriate language or the 
expectations of one’s peers. This is the cost of guilt in the model. 
Player 2 derives a benefit if player 1’s use of politically correct 
language is sincere, and a cost, if it is insincere. When player 1 
uses politically-correct language, player 2’s options are to either 
treat him with admiration (accept) or treat him with contempt 
(reject). If player 1 uses politically incorrect language, then player 
2’s payoff is zero. She derives no disutility from politically 
incorrect language, so long as it is sincere. An example of such 
politically incorrect language may be a member of a majority 
group who argues that most minorities at elite institutions would 
not have been there in the absence of affirmative action.42 
From the above propositions, it is easy to obtain an 
equilibrium with sincere politically correct language, as in 
proposition 1, and an equilibrium with politically correct 
language that may be insincere, as in proposition 2. 
                                                           
 40. See id. at 1059–95. 
 41. Glenn Loury defines a regime of political correctness as “an equilibrium 
pattern of expression and inference within a given community where receivers 
impute undesirable qualities to senders who express themselves in an ‘incorrect’ 
way and, as a result, senders avoid such expressions.” Glen C. Loury, Self-
Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of “Political Correctness” and Related 
Phenomena, 6 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 428, 435 (1994). 
 42. The point is not that people do not find such language offensive. There 
are definitely people who do. My focus is on those who do not find such language 
offensive, so long as it is sincere. 
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Political correctness may have the disadvantage that people 
are more likely to be suspicious of each other’s intentions. Hence, 
a decrease in social interactions akin to the positive probability of 
rejections in the equilibriums in proposition 2 may occur. Again, 
an insincere behavior, such as political correctness, need not be 
a bad thing even if it causes people to be suspicious of others’ 
intentions. One thing missing from the model is that player 2 
does not derive any disutility from not receiving an offer (i.e., a 
disutility from being rejected). If she did, then we could argue 
that she derives utility from an offer even if she intends to reject 
the offer. Therefore, political correctness need not be a bad thing 
if people derive utility from politically correct language per se. For 
example, people derive utility from others restraining their use of 
racist, anti-semitic, sexist, and homophobic language, even if 
they know that these people harbor such thoughts. Indeed, 
Stanley Fish argues that some restriction on free speech is 
desirable for precisely this reason.43 
However, if people do not value political correctness (i.e., 
insincerity) per se, then it could be welfare reducing as in the 
present model. To be sure, there are certain situations in which 
people prefer insincerity. For example, they may want their peers 
to not use racial slurs and instead use politically correct 
language. However, these same people may dislike insincerity in 
other situations. Player 2 may not want player 1 to offer help if 
his offer is insincere. As noted in section 2, such people may be 
called sincerity pragmatists. Indeed, as noted in the introduction 
and subsequently in the conclusion, John Kang and Judith 
Shklar forcefully argue that insincerity is necessary for mutually 
peaceful co-existence in a democracy.44 
In relationships, which require short-term investments by 
both parties, guilt aversion is more likely to support cooperation 
because an insincerity-averse person might believe that a guilt-
averse person could be behaving sincerely for a short period. 
However, if the relationship requires long-term investment, then 
an insincerity-averse person would not believe that a guilt-averse 
person could sustain his good behavior, so guilt-aversion is less 
likely to sustain co-operation. In this case, the insincerity-averse 
                                                           
 43. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD 
THING, TOO 111 (1994) (noting that it may be politically right to regulate use of 
certain hateful language). 
 44. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 246 (1984); see also Kang, Uses, 
supra note 16 at 386; Kang, Cases, supra note 16 at 154. 
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person has an instrumental value for sincerity. 
On the preceding point, whether a person accepts a 
potentially insincere offer depends on the costs of insincerity. 
However, there are some people who will accept insincere offers 
because forcing people to be nice to them out of guilt gives them 
a sense of power. In a different, but related context, imagine an 
affirmative action law that requires certain minorities to be 
employed at a public institution. A member of a minority group 
may feel empowered by working at this place, even if her 
superiors hired her reluctantly and therefore do not want her 
there. However, whether such a minority decides to work in such 
an environment depends on her belief in the legal system to 
protect her from unfair treatment while there. Hence, the 
expected cost of insincerity will influence her choice. This is 
related to Ian Ayres and Greg Klass’s point that a promisee will 
not care about the sincerity of a promisor if legal damages are 
fully compensatory in the event of a breach of contract.45 
The analysis has been based on the assumption that player 1 
incurs no cost if his offer is rejected. However, sometimes we do 
not invite certain people into closer relationships not because we 
do not like them, but because we are not sure if it is appropriate 
to offer to help them. By keeping the relationship at the original 
lower level, we do upset current dynamics. Indeed, a rejection 
could push the relationship to a much lower level. 
5. CONCLUSION 
I have presented an analysis of a common social 
phenomenon. Using a very simple model, I depart from previous 
analysis of guilt aversion by taking into account insincerity-
induced disutility stemming from guilt aversion. Insincerity-
aversion affects trust in relationships, cooperative behavior, and 
leads to deadweight losses (i.e., mutually beneficial trades may 
not be realized). 
To quote Judith Shklar, 
The democracy of everyday life, which is rightly admired by egalitarian 
visitors to America, does not arise from sincerity. . . . Not all of us are 
even convinced that all men are entitled to a certain minimum of social 
respect. Only some of us think so. But most of us always act as if we 
                                                           
 45. AYERS, supra note 20, at 62. 
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really did believe it, and that is what counts.46 
However, as the analysis in this paper points out, people 
driven by guilt may choose to be insincere when sincerity need 
not disturb mutually peaceful co-existence. On the other hand, 
sincerity pragmatists may be insincerity-averse in certain 
situations but not in others. The “truth” hurts, but not always. 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Consider two people, 1 and 2. Player 1 has the option of 
proposing to help player 2 in some activity. Suppose that nature 
gives player 1 a social type which is his private information. If 
person 1 is of social type wH > 0, then he derives a psychic benefit 
(joy) of wH from helping player 2. If he is of social type wL, then he 
incurs a cost of wL > 0 of helping player 2. Let the probability 
distribution of these types be such that Pr(wH) = p and Pr(wL) = 1-
p, p )1,0(∈ . Furthermore, player 1 feels guilty, if he does not offer 
to help player 2. I assume that player suffers a guilt cost denoted 
by G. 
Player 1’s guilt depends on the extent to which he believes 
that he has disappointed player 2. In particular, I assume that G 
= αD2, where D2 is the disappointment felt by player 2 when 
player 1 does not offer to help her and α is a positive parameter 
that captures player 1’s sensitivity to guilt. I shall endogenize D2 
but it is easier to do so when part of the solution to the game has 
been discussed. This is because D2 depends on endogenous 
second-order beliefs making the game a dynamic psychological 
game. 
An offer is insincere if it is extended by player 1 of type wL 
and it is sincere if it is extended by player 1 of type wH. 
If player 2 believes that player 1 genuinely wants her 
company or wants to help her, she gets a utility, v > 0, given that 
she accepted player 1’s offer. If she believes that player 1’s offer is 
insincere, she incurs a psychic cost of θ > 0, given that she 
accepted player 1’s offer. 
Let v be a random variable that is commonly known to be 
continuously distributed on ]v~,v[ with density f(v) and 
corresponding distribution function, F(v), .0v >  I assume that 
F(v) is a strictly increasing function. I assume that v is player 2’s 
private information but θ is common knowledge. 
After observing his social type, player 1 has two actions: offer 
                                                           
 46. SHKLAR, supra note 44, at 77. 
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to help (I) or do not offer to help (N). Player 2 has two actions: 
accept (A) or reject (R) an offer from player 1. The game is 
sequential. Player 1 is the first-mover and player 2 is the second-
mover. 
Player 1’s payoff is 
(a) u1 = wH, if he plays I, his social type is wH, and player 2 
plays A; 
(b) u1 = -wL, if he plays I, his social type is wL, and player 2 
plays A; 
(c) u1= -G, if he plays N; 
(d) u1 = 0, if he plays I and player 2 plays R. 
Player 2’s payoff, assuming for a moment that she knows 
player 1’s social type, is 
(i) u2 = -θ, if she plays A, given that player 1 of type wL played 
I; 
(ii) u2 = v, if she plays A, given that player 1 of type wH played 
I; 
(iii) u2 = 0, if she plays R. 
Player 1 need not show that his offer is out of guilt when his 
social type is wL. It is sufficient for player 2 to believe that player 
1’s offer is insincere. It is player 2’s inference about player 1’s 
intentions that matters. Therefore, the same action (i.e., offer) by 
player 1 could give player 2 different payoffs depending on her 
beliefs about player 1’s intentions. Given that given v > 0, player 
2 would accept any offer from player 1 if she did not care about 
player 1’s intentions. 
The players have common priors. All this information is 
common knowledge. In what follows, I assume that player 2 has 
intrinsic value for sincerity. 
Equilibrium Analysis 
I look for psychological perfect Bayesian equilibriums (PPBE) 
of this game. 
Note that if player 1 plays N, then player 2 does not have to 
respond. So player 2’s behavior is restricted to her response 
when player 1 plays I. For player 1, I consider both decisions (i.e., 
offer to help or not offer to help). 
Let ]1,0[∈σ  be the probability that player 2 rejects an offer 
from player 1 and let ]1,0[∈λ  be the probability that player 1 will 
offer to help player 2 when his social type is wL. Notice that when 
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player 1’s social type is wH, it trivially follows that he will offer to 
help player 2 with certainty. 
Given player 1’s strategy, player 2 computes the posterior 
probabilities 
pp
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Player 2’s expected equilibrium payoff if she accepts an offer 
from player 1 could be written as 
θρ−ρ=λ )Iw(v)Iw()(U LH2  (3) 
Player 2 rejects an offer, if )(2 λU < 0. It follows that player 2 
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Then it immediately follows that λ∂σ∂ /  > 0. Hence, player 2 
increases her rejection probability, if she believes that the 
probability of insincere offers is higher. 
Simple Guilt 
Let 1λ  be player 2’s first-order belief of λ and player 1’s belief 
(second-order) of 1λ  be 2λ .47 
If player 2 does not get an offer from player 1, her actual 
payoff is zero. If she gets an offer and she accepts it, then she 
expects a payoff of )(U 12 λ  > 0. So if she plans on accepting an 
offer, then her disappointment, given that she did not get an 
offer, is )(U 12 λ – 0 > 0. On the other hand, if she rejects an offer, 
she must believe that her payoff if she had accepted it would 
                                                           
 47. As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, supra note 26, I consider beliefs, at 
most, of the fourth order. 
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have been )(U 12 λ  < 0. So in this case, her disappointment from a 
non-offer is )(U 12 λ  – 0 < 0. So she actually suffers no 
disappointment from not getting an offer. 
Based on the above discussion, we may write player 2’s 
disappointment as 
D2( 1λ , v, θ) = max [ )(U 12 λ - 0, 0] (5) 
Player 1 needs to determine his optimal offer probability, λ. 
But to do so he has to form beliefs about 1λ since D2( 1λ , v, θ) is a 
function of 1λ . Hence player 1’s optimal choice of λ depends on 
his second-order beliefs (i.e., λ2) of λ and thus on player 2’s 
expectation of the equilibrium play of the game. Player 1’s payoff 
does not only depend on player 2’s actions but also depends on 
his endogenous beliefs of player 2’s beliefs. Indeed, since ρH 
≡ )Iw( Hρ is a function of λ, it follows that player 1’s payoff 
depends on his beliefs of player 2’s updated beliefs of his social 
type. Therefore, we may write player 1’s cost of guilt as 
G = αD2(ρH( 2λ ), v, θ). 
I abuse notation by rewriting player 1’s cost of guilt as 
G = αD2( 2λ , v, θ), (6) 
where α > 0 is common knowledge and, as defined before, 
measures player 1’s sensitivity to guilt. The formulation in (6) 
makes this game a psychological game where player 1 has belief-
dependent preferences about player 2’s updated belief about his 
social type. 
It is important to reiterate that player 1 might feel guilty if 
and only if he does not offer to help player 2, and does not feel 
guilty if player 2 rejects his offer. Indeed, as argued above, player 
2 feels no disappointment if she rejects player 1’s offer. 
Since player 1 knows θ and knows the distribution of v, he 
uses the expected value of v (i.e., v ) in his decision making. That 
is, he assumes that player 2’s disappointment from a non-offer is 
D2 = max[ θρ−−ρ )1(v HH , 0], where 
 θρ−−ρ )1(v HH = )v(dF)(Uv
~
v 2 ⋅∫ . 
I characterize the equilibriums of this game under the 
following three exhaustive cases: (a) σ < 1- G/wL, (b) σ = 1- G/wL, 
and (c) σ > 1- G/wL. 
Case (a): σ < 1- G/wL 
Suppose λ1 = 2λ = 0. Then player 2 believes that player 1 will 
not offer to help her when his social type is wL. Player 1 also 
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believes that player 2 believes that player 1 will not offer to help 
her when his social type is wL. Suppose also that (1-σ)wL > 
α{max[ θρ−−ρ )1(v HH , 0]}= α( θρ−−ρ )1(v HH ) > 0. Then player 
1’s optimal response is λ= 0. Note that 
(1-σ)wL > α( θρ−−ρ )1(v HH ) = G > 0 holds if v  is sufficiently low 
and/or θ is sufficiently high and/or α is sufficiently low. This 
gives proposition 1 in the text.48 
Case (b): σ > 1- G/wL 
Now suppose that 1λ = *2 λ=λ = 1. Also, assume that –(1 – σ)wL 
> – α(ρH v – (1- ρH)θ) , where ρH = p and ρH v – (1- ρH)θ > 0. This 
gives proposition 2 in the text. 
Note that we do not have to worry about out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs in any of the equilibriums above. Suppose that in 
proposition 2, player 2 observed an out-of-equilibrium action of N 
by player 1. Then the game ends, so player 2’s beliefs are 
irrelevant. In proposition 1, player 1 plays either N or I with 
positive probability, so player 2 will continue to update her beliefs 
using Bayes’ rule. 
It is straightforward to apply the model to a situation in 
which player 2 has an instrumental value for sincerity. Imagine 
that accepting player 1’s offer requires an investment, e, by 
player 2 into an activity, which yields a net benefit of Ve if player 
1 is sincere and cost of θe if player 1 is insincere. This cost may 
be incurred because player 1 of type wL does not put enough 
effort into the activity. However, player 2 will not suffer this cost 
if player 1 exerts the required effort, regardless of whether he did 
so out of guilt or wholeheartedly. The cost of effort to player 2 is 
C(e) which is an increasing and strictly convex function. Then 
player 2’s expected payoff is U2(e, λ1) = [ρHv – (1- ρH)θ]e – C(e). It 
immediately follows that e*(λ1) = argmax U2(e, λ1) = 
))1(v(C HH1 θρ−−ρ′− . The inverse of )e(C′ exists because it is a 
monotonic function. Clearly, e* is decreasing in λ1 and by the 
envelope theorem, U2(e*(λ1), λ1) is also decreasing in λ1. Then D2 = 
max[U2(e*(λ1), λ1) – 0, 0] is also decreasing in λ1 for U2(e*(λ1), λ1) > 
0.49 
Player 1 of type wL extends an offer hoping that player 2 will 
                                                           
 48. In proving this proposition, I assumed that θρ−−ρ )H1(vH > 0. This 
proposition also holds if θρ−−ρ )H1(vH  ≤ 0 which gives G = αD2 = 0. 
 49. Of course, player 2 will set e* > 0 if and only if U2(e*, λ1) > 0. Otherwise, 
she will set e* = 0. 
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reject it. In doing so, he compares (1 – σ)wL to G = αD2. But if 
player 2 accepts the offer, then ex post, player 1 of type wL will 
not invest in the activity (i.e., renege on his offer to help) if wL > 
G. This latter condition is consistent with (1 – σ)wL > G and (1 – 
σ)wL ≤ G. By imposing the restriction wL > G, player 1 of social 
type wL will always be insincere ex post (i.e., after his offer has 
been accepted). Hence whether player 2 has an intrinsic or 
instrumental value for sincerity makes no difference to the 
analysis. Therefore all the above propositions continue to hold. 
